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Abstract. The ElGamal encryption scheme is described in the setting 
of any finite cyclic group G. Among the groups of most interest in 
cryptography are the multiplicative group Z  of the ring of integers 
modulo a prime p, and the multiplicative groups F  of finite fields 
of characteristic two. The later requires finding irreducible 
polynomials h(x) and constructing the quotient ring . 
El-Kassar et al. modified the ElGamal scheme to the domain of 
Gaussian integers. El-Kassar and Haraty gave an extension in the 
multiplicative group of . Their major finding is that the 
quotient ring need not be a field. In this paper, we consider another 
extension employing the group of units of , where 
is a product of irreducible polynomials whose 
degrees are pairwise relatively prime. The arithmetic needed in this 
new setting is described. Examples, algorithms and proofs are given. 
Advantages of the new method are pointed out and comparisons with 
the classical case of  are made. 
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1. Introduction 
The ElGamal encryption scheme is typically described in the setting of the 
multiplicative group , the group of units of the ring of integers modulo 
a prime p, but it can be easily generalized to work in any finite cyclic 
group G. The security of the generalized ElGamal encryption scheme is 
based on the intractability of the discrete logarithm problem in the group 
G. The group G should be carefully chosen so that the group operations in 
*
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G would be relatively easy to apply for efficiency. In addition, the discrete 
logarithm problem in G should be computationally infeasible for the 
security of the protocol that uses the ElGamal public-key cryptosystem. 
The groups of most interest in cryptography are the multiplicative groups 
 of the finite field F*qF q, including the particular cases of the 
multiplicative groups , and the multiplicative group  of the finite 
field  of characteristic two. Also of interest is the group of units  
where n is a composite integer such that n is 2, 4, p
*
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t, or 2 pt, where p is an 
odd prime and t is an integer. 
    Cross [1] gave a classification of all Gaussian integers β such that the 
group of units of the quotient ring Z[i]/<β> is cyclic. So, one may consider 
ElGamal public-key cryptosystem using the cyclic group of units of 
Z[i]/<β>, where β = 1+i, (1+i)², (1+i)³, p, (1+i)p, πⁿ, (1+i) πⁿ, p is a prime 
integer of the form 4k+3, and π is a Gaussian prime with |π|2 is a prime 
integer of the form 4k+1. Recently, El-Kassar et al. [3] described the 
computational procedures using arithmetic modulo Gaussian integers 
required for the extension of ElGamal encryption scheme to the domain of 
Gaussian integers. 
    In [8], Smith and Gallian determined the structure of the group of units 
of the quotient ring Fq[x]/<f(x)>, where f(x) is a polynomial in Fq[x]. Using 
this decomposition, El-Kassar et al. [4], gave a characterization of 
quotient rings of polynomials over finite fields with a cyclic group of units. 
In [5], this classification was applied to ElGamal encryption scheme to the 
setting of Zp[x]/<x2>. The purpose of this paper is to use this classification 
to apply ElGamal encryption scheme to the setting of Fq[x]/<f(x)>, where 
f(x) is a reducible polynomial in Fq[x]. In particular, we consider ElGamal 
encryption scheme in the setting of the group of units of , 
where 
>< )(/][2 xhxZ( ) ( ) ( )xhxhxhxh r...)( 21=  is a product of irreducible polynomials 
whose degrees are pairwise relatively prime. 
    The rest of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 describes the 
classical ElGamal scheme. In section 3, we summarize the extension, 
given in [3], of ElGamal cryptosystem to the domain of Gaussian integers. 
Section 4 presents the classification, obtained in [4], of quotient rings of 
polynomials Fq[x]/<f(x)> having cyclic group of units. Section 5 describes 
the extension, given in [5], of ElGamal cryptosystem in the setting of 
Zp[x]/<x2>. Section 6 introduces the new method in the setting of quotient 
rings of polynomials over a finite field, other than Zp[x]/<x2>, having cyclic 
group of units. Section 7 points out some of the advantages of the new 
method and compares it to the classical case of . Finally, section 8 
concludes the paper. 
mF2
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2. The Classical ElGamal Public Key Encryption Scheme 
The classical ElGamal cryptosystem, see [2] and [7], can be described as 
follows. Let p be a large odd prime integer and let Zp = {0, 1, 2, 3, ..., p−1}. 
Then, Zp is a ring under addition and multiplication modulo p. Since p is 
prime, Zp is actually a field under these operations. Moreover,  = {1, 2, 
3, ..., p−1}, the multiplicative group of the ring integers modulo p, is a 
cyclic group generated by some generator θ ≠ 1 whose order is equal to 
p−1. That is, every element of  is a power of θ. Note that Z
*
pZ
*
pZ p is a 
complete residue system modulo p and  is a reduced residue system 
modulo p. For further algebraic properties, see [6] and [7]. 
*
pZ
    Suppose that entity B wants to send a message m to entity A. Entity B 
proceeds as follows: B gets the public key generated by A, then computes 
the ciphered message c = EA(m) and sends it to A for decryption. To 
decipher it, A computes DA(c) = m. 
    Entity A generates the public-key by first generating a large random 
prime p and a generator θ of . Then A chooses randomly an integer a, 1 
≤ a ≤ p−2, and computes θ
*
pZ
a (mod p). The public key is (p, θ, θa) and A's 
private key is a.   
    To encrypt the message m chosen from Zp, entity B first obtains A's 
public-key (p, θ, θa). Then B chooses a random integer k, where 2 ≤ k ≤ 
p−2, computes γ ≡ θk (mod p) and δ ≡ m·(θa)k (mod p). The ciphertext is c = 
(γ,δ). 
To decrypt the message c sent by B, A uses the private key and recovers 
the message m by computing γ−a.δ (mod p). 
 
Example 1. In order to generate the public key, entity A selects the prime 
p = 359 and a generator θ = 124 of . A chooses the private key a = 292 
and computes θ
*
359Z
a = 124292 ≡ 205 (mod 359). Therefore, A's public-key is (p = 
359, θ = 124, θa = 205) and A's private key is a = 292. To encrypt the 
message m = 101, B selects a random integer k = 247 and computes γ = 
291 ≡124247 (mod 359) and δ = 288 ≡ 101·205247 (mod 359). Then B sends γ 
= 291 and δ = 288 to A. We note that B has 359 choices for m in Z259. 
Finally, A computes γp−1−a = 29166 ≡ 216 (mod 359) and recovers m by 
computing 216·288 ≡ 101        (mod 359). 
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3. ElGamal Public Key Cryptosystem in the Domain of 
Gaussian Integers 
In [3], the ElGamal public key encryption scheme was extended to the 
domain of Gaussian integers Z[i] = {a+bi | a, b ∈ Z}. Algorithms and 
examples illustrating these modifications were given. The arithmetics in 
the domain of Gaussian integers were applied to extend the ElGamal 
cryptosystem as follows. Let β be a Gaussian prime integer and let Gβ be a 
set of representatives of the elements of the quotient ring Z[i]/<β>. Then, 
Gβ is a field under addition and multiplication modulo β having a cyclic 
multiplicative group . Note that G*βG β is a complete residue system 
modulo β and  is a reduced residue system modulo β.  If β = π, where q 
= |π|
*βG
2 is a prime integer of the form 4k+1, then Gπ = {a | 0 ≤ a ≤ q−1} = Zq, 
see [1]. This choice will be excluded since the calculations in this case are 
identical to those of the classical one. Hence, β is chosen to be a large 
prime integer p of the form 4k+3 so that Gβ = {a+bi | 0 ≤ a ≤ p−1, 0 ≤ b ≤ p 
−1}, where the number of elements in Gβ is p² and in  is φ(β) = p²−1. 
Hence, the cyclic group used in the extended ElGamal cryptosystem has 
an order larger than the square of that used in the classical ElGamal 
cryptosystem with no additional efforts required for finding the prime p. 
Now, a generator θ of  is selected and note that there are φ(p²−1) 
generators in . Then a random positive integer a is chosen so that the 
public-key is (p, θ, θ
*βG
*βG
*βG
a). Since a is a power of θ, then a must be less than the 
order of the group power  which is p²−1. This power of a is the private 
key. 
*βG
    To encrypt a message m, we first represent it as an element m in Gβ. 
Then, a random positive integer k is selected to be used as a power so that 
k is less than p²−1. The encrypted message is c = (γ, δ) where γ ≡ θk (mod β) 
and δ ≡ m.(θa)k (mod β). Note that the values of γ and δ must be elements 
of Gβ and hence must be reduced modulo β. The message c is decrypted 
using the private key a to compute γ−a.δ modulo β. 
 
Example 2. In order to generate the public-key, entity A selects the 
Gaussian prime β = 359 and a generator θ = 1+11i of . A chooses the 
private key a = 86427 and computes θ
*
111 iG +
a modulo β, which is θa = (1+11i)86427 
≡  323+295i (mod 359).  Therefore, A's public-key is (p = 359, θ = 1+11i, θa 
= 323+295i) and A's private key is a = 86427. To encrypt the message m = 
101, B selects a random integer k = 115741 and computes γ = (1+11i)115741 
≡ 149+117i (mod 359) and δ = 101·(323+295i)115741 ≡ 147+209i (mod 359). 
Then B sends γ = 149+117i and δ = 147+209i to A. We note that B has 
128880 choices for m in G359. Finally, A computes γβ²−1−a= (149+117i)42453 ≡ 
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117+178i (mod 359), and recovers m by computing (117+178i)·(147+209i) 
≡ 101 (mod 359). 
4. Quotient Rings of Polynomials over a Field with Cyclic 
Groups of Units 
The generalized ElGamal public key cryptosystem is usually studied in 
the setting of a finite field Fq and is based on working with the quotient 
ring Zp[x]/<h(x)>, where h(x) is an irreducible polynomial over Zp[x], q = 
pⁿ, and p is a prime integer. In the following, we extend the ElGamal 
public key cryptosystem to the setting of quotient ring of polynomials over 
a field, Fq[x]/<h(x)>, having a cyclic group of units, where h(x) is not 
necessarily irreducible. It is well known that if h(x) is an irreducible 
polynomial of degree n, then Zp[x]/<h(x)> = {a0+a1x+...+an−1xn−1 | a0, a1,..., 
an−1∈Zp} is a field whose elements are the congruence classes modulo h(x) 
of polynomials in Zp[x] with degree less than that of h(x). Note that the 
representatives of the elements of Zp[x]/<h(x)> form a complete residue 
system modulo h(x) in Zp[x]. Moreover, Zp[x]/<h(x)> is a finite field of order 
pⁿ and its nonzero elements form its cyclic group of units, U(Zp[x]/<h(x)>), 
of order φ(h(x)) = pⁿ−1. 
    Now consider the factor ring Fq[x]/<f(x)>, where Fq is a finite field of 
order q and f(x) is a polynomial of degree n. Then Fq[x]/<f(x)> = 
{a0+a1x+...+an−1xn−1 | a0, a1,..., an−1∈ Fq} is a ring whose elements are the 
congruence classes modulo f(x) of polynomials in Fq[x] with degree less 
than that of f(x). For each irreducible polynomial h(x) of degree n over a 
finite field Fq, the factor ring Fq[x]/<h(x)> is a finite field of order qⁿ. Its 
group of units is isomorphic to the cyclic group Zqⁿ−1. In the case where f(x) 
is not irreducible over Fq, the quotient ring Fq[x]/<f(x)> is not a field. 
However, f(x) can be selected so that the group of units of the quotient 
ring Fq[x]/<f(x)> is cyclic. This can be done by using the structure of the 
group of units of Fq[x]/<f(x)> given by Smith and Gallian [8]. Before we 
summarize their results we recall the following well-known results. For a 
finite commutative ring R with identity, we know from the fundamental 
theorem of finite abelian groups that U(R) is isomorphic to a direct 
product of cyclic groups. Also, if R is a direct sum of rings then its group of 
units is isomorphic to the direct product of the corresponding group of 
units of each of the summands. 
 
 
 
Theorem 1.If ,...21 iRRRR ⊕⊕⊕=  then )(...)()()( 21 iRURURURU ×××= . 
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    Since Fq[x] is a unique factorization domain, then f(x) can be written as 
a product of powers of irreducible polynomials, 
, in Frmmm xrhxhxhxf )(...)()()( 21 21= q[x] and 
. In the case 
where f(x) is not irreducible over F
><⊕⊕><>≅< rmrqmqq xhxFxhxFxfxF )(/][...)(/][)(/][ 11
q, theorem 1 can be applied and the 
problem reduces to that of finding the structure of ( )>< mq xhxFU )(/][ , 
where h(x) is irreducible over Fq. This result is stated as follows. 
 
Lemma 1. If , where the polynomials hrmmm xrhxhxhxf )(...)()()( 21 21= i(x),      
1 ≤ i ≤ r, are distinct irreducible polynomials in Fq[x], then  ( ) ( ) ( )><××><≅>< rmrqmqq xhxFUxhxFUxfxFU )(/][...)(/][)(/][ 11 . 
 
    The following theorems simplify the problem further. 
 
Theorem 2. Let Fq be a finite field and let h(x) be an irreducible 
polynomial in Fq[x] . If a is a root of h(x) and K = Fq(a), the extension of Fq 
by a, then . ><>≅< mmq xxKxhxF /][)(/][
 
Theorem 3. Let K be a finite field with pⁿ elements, where p is prime. 
Then, , where m is any 
positive integer, s = min { h∈Z | p
∏
=
+−− +−×≅><
s
i
piiip
m
in kkknxxKU
1
111
*)2()/][( ZZ
h ≥ m}, ki = max {h∈Z | hpi < m}, and 
 means  occurs in the product t times. ipt Z* ipZ
    The above lemma and theorems can be combined to classify the group of 
units of any quotient ring of the form Fq[x]/<f(x)>. Now we turn to the 
problem of classifying all quotient rings of polynomials Fq[x]/<f(x)> with 
cyclic group of units. The results obtained in the remainder of this section 
are found in [4]. If h(x) is an irreducible polynomial over Fq of degree n, we 
have that Fq[x]/<h(x)> is a field of order qⁿ = pnd. Hence, U(Fq[x]/<h(x)>) is 
cyclic with order qⁿ−1 = pnd−1 and U(Fq[x]/<h(x)>)≅ .          1−ndpZ
    Next we consider the case where f(x) is a power of an irreducible 
polynomial h(x), that is f(x) = h(x)m. We note that if h(x) is of degree 1, 
then U(Fq[x]/<h(x)m>)≅ U(Fq[x]/<xm>). Also note that in order for 
to be cyclic, the 
product must contain at most one nontrivial 
factor since the order of each is divisible by p. The different cases 
( ) ∏
=
+−− +−×≅><
s
i
piiipq id
kkkdxfxFU
1
111
*)2()(/][ ZZ
∏
=
+− +−
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i
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when U(Fq[x]/<h(x)>) are cyclic depend on the characteristic of the field 
and are characterized in the following theorem. 
 
Theorem 4. Let Fq be a finite field of order q = pn, where p is a prime 
integer, and let h1(x), h2(x), …, hr(x) be the distinct irreducible factors of 
f(x) in Fq[x] whose degrees, deg hj(x) = dj , 1 ≤ j ≤ r, are pairewise relatively 
prime. Then, U(Fq[x]/<f(x)>) is cyclic if and only if one of the following is 
true: 
i) f(x) = h1(x) is irreducible and ( )
11
)(/][ −≅>< dqq xfxFU Z . 
ii) f(x) = h1(x)2 , where h1(x) is linear, q = p and ( ) ( ) pppq xfxUxfxFU ZZZ ×≅><=>< −1)(/][)(/][ . 
iii) )()...()()( 21 xhxhxhxf r= ,q = 2, and ( ) ≅>< )(/][ xfxFU q  
. 
121212 21 −−− ××× rddd ... ZZZ
iv) , q = 2, h221 )x(h)...x(h)x(h)x(f r= r(x) is linear, and ( ) ≅>< )(/][ xfxFU q 2121212 121 ZZZZ ×××× −−− −rddd ... . 
5. ElGamal Public Key Cryptosystem over Zp[x]/<x²> 
Now we describe the extended ElGamal encryption scheme over quotient 
rings of polynomials Zp[x]/<h(x)> where h(x) is reducible. From the study 
above we conclude that in order for the group of units U(Zp[x]/<h(x)>), 
where p is an odd prime, to be cyclic, h(x) must be a square power of only 
one linear irreducible polynomial. That is, U(Zp[x]/<(ax+b)²>) is cyclic. 
But, Zp[x]/<(ax+b)²>≅ Zp[x]/<x²>. Hence, we can extend the ElGamal 
scheme in the setting of the group of units of the ring Zp[x]/<x²>, of order 
φ(x²) = p(p−1). In Zp[x]/<x²>, x2 is zero. Also, a polynomial f(x) in Zp[x] 
belongs to the cyclic group U(Zp[x]/<x²>) if and only if gcd(f(x), x) = 1. 
Equivalently, x does not divide the linear polynomial f(x) so that 
U(Zp[x]/<x²>) = {c+dx | 1 ≤ c ≤ p−1,      0 ≤ d ≤ p−1} ≅ Zp−1×Zp.  
    The extended ElGamal cryptosystem in this setting is given in the 
following three algorithms. First, to generate the corresponding public 
and private keys, entity A should use the following algorithm: 
 
Algorithm 1. (Key generation) 
 
1. Generate a large random prime p and select the reducible 
polynomial h(x) in Zp[x] to be a square of a linear polynomial, 
say x2, and compute φ(x²) = p(p−1). 
2. Find a generator α(x) of the multiplicative group U(Zp[x]/<x²>). 
That is, U(Zp[x]/<x²>)= {1, α(x), α(x)²,....,α(x)p²−p−1}. 
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3. Select a random integer a, 2 ≤ a ≤ φ(x²)−1. Note that the integer 
a should be a natural integer in the interval [2, p²−p−2]. 
4. Compute α(x)a (mod x²). 
5. A's public key is (p, x², α(x), α(x)a); A's private key is a. 
 
    To encrypt a message m(x)∈ Zp[x]/<x²>, entity B should use the 
following algorithm: 
 
Algorithm 2. (Encryption scheme) 
 
 1. Obtain A′s authentic public key (p, x², α(x), α(x)a). 
 2. Select a random integer k, 2 ≤ k ≤ φ(x²)−1. 
 3. Represent the message as a polynomial m(x)∈ U(Zp[x]/<x²>). 
 4. Compute γ(x) ≡ α(x)k (mod x²) and δ(x) ≡ m(x).(α(x)a)k (mod x²). 
 5. Send the ciphertext (γ(x), δ(x)) to A. 
 
    To decrypt the ciphertext (γ(x), δ(x)) sent by entity B, entity A should 
use the following algorithm: 
 
 
 
Algorithm 3. (Decryption scheme) 
 
 1. Receives the ciphertext (γ(x), δ(x)) sent by entity B. 
 2. Use the private key a to compute γ(x)p²−p−a (mod x²). 
 3. Recover the plaintext m(x) by computing γ(x)−a.δ(x) (mod x²). 
 
    The following theorem proves that the decryption formula γ(x)−a.δ(x)      
(mod x²)  allows the recovery of the original plaintext m(x). 
 
Theorem 5. Given a generator α(x) of the multiplicative group of the ring 
Zp[x]/<x²>, define γ(x) and δ(x) by γ(x) ≡ α(x)a (mod x²) and γ(x) ≡ 
m(x).(α(x)a)k (mod x²). If s(x) ∈ Zp[x]/<x²> such that s(x) ≡ γ(x)−a.δ(x) (mod 
x²), then m(x) = s(x). 
 
Proof. Since γ(x) ≡ α(x)a(mod x²), where α(x) is a generator of the 
multiplicative group U(Zp[x]/<x²>), it follows that γ(x) is in U(Zp[x]/<x²>) so 
that gcd(γ(x), x²) = 1. Therefore, using a version of Fermat's little theorem 
for polynomials over a finite field, we have that γ(x)p(p−1)−1 ≡ 1 (mod x²). 
Then, γ(x)(p²−-p−1)−a ≡ γ(x)−a ≡ α(x)−ak (mod x²) and thus γ(x)−aδ(x) ≡ 
α(x)−ak.m(x).α(x)ak ≡ m(x) (mod x²). Since m(x) and s(x) belong to the same 
reduced residue system modulo x² and s(x) ≡ m(x) (mod x²), we have that 
m(x) = s(x). Hence, m(x) is recovered by reducing γ(x)−a.δ(x) modulo x². 
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Example 3. For p = 3, U(Z3[x]/<x²>) = { 1, 2, 1+x, 2+x,1+2x, 2+2x} and φ(x²) 
= 6. Note that x² is the zero in Z3[x]/<x²>. To find a generator to 
U(Z[x]/<x²>), select the polynomial α(x) = 2+x in U(Z3[x]/<x²>). The prime 
divisors of φ(x²) = 6, the order of the group U(Z3[x]/<x²>), are 2 and 3. Since 
(2+x)(6/3) = 4 + 4x + 4x² = 4 + 4x ≡ 1+x ≠1 (mod x2) over Z3 and (2+x) (6/2) = 
2+3x+x² ≡ 2 ≠ 1 (mod x2) over Z3, we have that α(x) = 2+x is a generator. To 
generate the corresponding public and private keys, entity A should first 
choose its own private key a = 4, then computes α(x)a = α(x)4 = (2+x)4 ≡ 
1+2x (mod x²). Thus, A′s private key is a = 4 and public key is (3, x², 2+x, 
1+2x). To encrypt the message m(x) = 2x+2, entity B selects randomly an 
integer k = 3, then computes γ(x) = α(x)k = (2+x)³ ≡ 2 (mod x²) and  δ(x) = 
m(x).(α(x)a)k = (2x+2).((2+x)4)³ ≡ 2+2x (mod x²). The ciphertext is c(x) = 
(γ(x), δ(x)). Hence, entity B sends the ciphertext (2, 2x+2) to entity A. To 
decrypt the sent ciphertext (2, 2x+2), entity B should use its own private 
key a = 4 to compute γ(x)−a ≡ γ(x)p(p−1)−a} = (2)6−4 ≡ 1 (mod x²). Finally, the 
plaintext m(x) can be recovered by computing s(x) = γ(x)−a.δ(x) ≡ 1.(2x+2) = 
2x+2 (mod x²). 
6. ElGamal Cryptosystem in Z2[x]/<h1(x).h2(x)...hr(x)> 
Now we describe the extended ElGamal encryption scheme in the quotient 
rings of polynomials Z2[x]/<h(x)>, where h(x) is reducible not of the form 
(ax+b)2. From theorem 4,  we conclude that in order for the group of units 
U(Z2[x]/<h(x)>) to be cyclic, h(x) = h1(x).h2(x)...hr(x) where the dj′s are 
pairwise relatively prime and U(Z2[x]/<h(x)>) ≅ 121212 21 −−− ××× rddd ... ZZZ , 
or f(x) = h1(x).h2(x)...hr(x)2 with U(Z2[x]/<h(x)>) 
≅ . Hence, we can extend the ElGamal scheme 
in the setting of the group of units U(Z
2121212 121 ... ZZZZ ×××× −−− −rddd
2[x]/<h(x)>) ≅ 
, of order φ(h(x)) = 121212 ...21 −−− ××× rddd ZZZ ( )( ) ( )12...1212 21 −−− rddd . We 
note that a polynomial h(x) in Z2[x] belongs to the cyclic group 
U(Z2[x]/<h(x)>)≅ 121212 ...21 −−− ××× rddd ZZZ  if and only if gcd(f(x), h(x)) = 1. 
This is equivalent to say that gcd(f(x), hj(x)) = 1, for every j, 1 ≤ j ≤ r.  
    The extended ElGamal cryptosystem in this setting is given next 
through three algorithms. First, to generate the corresponding public and 
private keys, entity A should use the following algorithm: 
 
Algorithm 4. (Generating the Key) 
 
1. Select pairwise relatively prime integers d1, d2, ..., dr. 
2. Find irreducible polynomials h2(x), h2(x), ..., hr(x) over Z2 with      
deg hj(x) = dj. 
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3. Form h(x) = h1(x).h2(x)...hr(x). 
4. Find φ(h(x)) = ( )( ) ( )12...1212 21 −−− rddd . 
5. Find a generator α(x) of the multiplicative group 
U(Z2[x]/<h(x)>). That is, U(Z2[x]/<h(x)>) = { 1, α(x), α(x)², ...., 
α(x)φ(h(x))−1}. 
6. Select a random integer a, 2 ≤ a ≤ φ(h(x))−1.  
7. Compute α(x)a (mod h(x)). 
8. A's public key is (h(x), α(x), α(x)a); A's private key is a. 
 
    To encrypt a message m(x)∈Z2[x]/<h(x)>, entity B should use the 
following algorithm: 
 
Algorithm 5. (Encryption scheme) 
 
1. Obtain A′s authentic public key (h(x), α(x), α(x)a). 
2. Select a random integer k, 2 ≤ k ≤ φ(h(x)). 
3. Represent the message as a polynomial m(x)∈ Z2[x]/<h(x)>. 
4. Compute γ(x) ≡ α(x)k (mod h(x)) and δ(x) ≡ m(x).(α(x)a)k (mod 
h(x)). 
5. Send the ciphertext (γ(x), δ(x)) to A. 
 
    To decrypt the ciphertext (γ(x), δ(x)) sent by entity B, entity A should 
use the following algorithm: 
 
 
 
Algorithm 6. (Decryption scheme) 
 
1. Receive the ciphertext (γ(x), δ(x)) sent by entity B. 
2. Use the private key a to compute γ(x)φ(h(x))−a (mod h(x)). 
3. Recover the plaintext m(x) by computing γ(x)−a.δ(x) (mod h(x)). 
 
    The following theorem proves that the decryption formula γ(x)−a.δ(x) 
(mod h(x)) allows the recovery of the original plaintext m(x). 
 
Theorem 6. Given a generator α(x) of the multiplicative group of the ring 
Z2[x]/<h(x)>, where h(x) = h1(x).h2(x)...hr(x) is a product of irreducible 
polynomials with deg hj = dj and the dj′s are pairwise relatively prime. 
Define γ(x) and δ(x) by γ(x) ≡ α(x)a (mod h(x)) and γ(x) ≡ m(x).(α(x)a)k (mod 
h(x)). If s(x) ∈ Zp[x]/< h(x)> such that s(x) ≡ γ(x)−a.δ(x) (mod h(x)), then m(x) 
= s(x). 
 
Proof. Since γ(x) ≡ α(x)a (mod h(x)), where α(x) is a generator of the 
multiplicative group U(Z2[x]/<h(x)>), it follows that γ(x) is in 
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U(Z2[x]/<h(x)>) so that gcd(γ(x), h(x)) = 1. Therefore, using a version of 
Fermat's little theorem for polynomials over a finite field, we have that 
γ(x)φ(h(x)) ≡ 1 (mod h(x)). Then, γ(x)φ(h(x))−a ≡ γ(x)−a ≡ α(x)−ak (mod h(x)) and 
thus s(x) ≡ γ(x)−aδ(x) ≡ α(x)−ak.m(x).α(x)ak ≡ m(x) (mod h(x)). Since m(x) and 
s(x) are in the same complete residue system modulo h(x) and s(x) ≡ m(x) 
(mod h(x)), we have that m(x) = s(x). Hence, m(x) is recovered by reducing 
γ(x)−a.γ(x) modulo h(x). 
 
Example 4. For d1 = 2 and d2 = 3. Select the irreducible polynomials h1(x) = 
x²+ x+ 1 and h2(x) = x³+ x+ 1. Then h(x) = h1(x). h2(x) = (x²+ x+ 1).(x³+ x + 
1) = x⁵ + x4+ 1 and Z2[x]/<h(x)> = {0, 1, x, 1 + x, x², 1 + x², x + x², 1 + x + x², 
x³, 1 + x³, x + x³,  1 + x + x³, x² + x³, 1 + x² + x³, x + x² + x³,  1 + x + x² + x³, 
x4, 1 + x4, x + x4, 1 + x + x4, x² + x4,  1 + x² + x4, x + x² + x4, 1 + x + x² + x4, x³ 
+ x4,  1 + x³ + x4, x + x³ + x4, 1 + x + x³ + x4, x² + x³ + x4,  1 + x² + x³ + x4, x + 
x² + x³ + x4, 1 + x + x² + x³ + x4}. Note that the order of Z2[x]/< x⁵ + x4+ 1> 
is  = 2².2³ = 32. Also note that x⁵ = x21 2.2 dd 4+ 1 in Z2[x]/<h(x)>. Now 
U(Z2[x]/<h(x)>) = {1, x, 1 + x, x², 1 + x², x + x², x³, x + x³, x² + x³, 1 + x² + x³, 
1 + x + x² + x³, x4, 1 + x4,  1 + x + x4, x² + x4, 1 + x + x² + x4, x³ + x4,  1 + x³ + 
x4, x + x³ + x4, x + x² + x³ + x4, 1 + x + x² + x³ + x4} and φ(h(x)) =  ( )( )1212 21 −− dd  = (2²−1)(2³−1) = 21. To find a generator to U(Z2[x]/<h(x)>), 
select the polynomial α(x) = x in U(Z2[x]/<h(x)>). The order φ(h(x)) = 21 has 
two prime divisors 3 and 7. Since (x)3 ≠ 1 over Z2[x]/<h(x)> and (x)= 
x²(x) = x²(x4+1) = x+ x² = x(x) + x² = x(x4 + 1)+ x² = x+ x+ x² = x4 + x + 
x² + 1 ≠ 1 in Z2[x]/<h(x)>. Hence, α(x) = x is a generator. To generate the 
corresponding public and private keys, entity A should first choose its own 
private key a = 11, then computes α(x)a = α(x)¹¹ = (x)¹¹ ≡ 1+x²+x³ (mod 
h(x)). Thus, A′s private key is a = 11 and public key is (h(x), α(x), α(x)a) =  
(x5+x4+1, x, x³+x²+1). To encrypt the message m(x) = x4 + x² + 1, entity B 
selects randomly an integer k = 17, then computes γ(x) = α(x)k = (x)¹≡ 1+x 
(mod h(x)) and  δ(x) = m(x).(α(x)a)k = (x4+ x²+ 1).(1+ x²+ x³)¹≡ 1+x³ (mod 
h(x)). Hence, entity B sends the ciphertext (1+x, 1+x³) to entity A. To 
decrypt the sent ciphertext (1+x, 1+x³), entity A should use its own private 
key a = 11 to compute γ(x)−a ≡ γ(x)φ(h(x))−a = (1+x)21−11 ≡ x² (mod h(x)). 
Finally, the plaintext m(x) can be recovered by computing s(x) = γ(x)−a.δ(x) 
≡ x².(1+x³) = x4 + x²+ 1 (mod h(x)). 
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7. Efficiency and Security of ElGamal Cryptosystem in the 
Domain of Polynomials over a Finite Field    
The ElGamal encryption scheme can described in any finite cyclic group 
G. The security of the ElGamal encryption scheme is based on the 
intractability of the discrete logarithm problem in G. The group G should 
be carefully selected for efficiency and security so that the operation in G 
can be easily applied and the discrete logarithm problem in G should be 
computationally infeasible. Among groups meeting these criteria that 
have received the most attention are the multiplicative group of Zp and 
the multiplicative group of the finite field of characteristic two . We 
proposed three modifications of ElGamal encryption employing the group 
of units of: 
mF2
1. Z[i]/<β>, where β is a prime Gaussian integer of the form p = 4k+3; 
2. Zp[x]/<x2>, where p is an odd prime integer; 
3. Z2[x]/<h(x)>, where h(x) = h1(x).h2(x)...hr(x) is a product of irreducible 
polynomials with deg hj(x) = dj and the dj′s are pairwise relatively 
prime. 
 
    These modifications generalize the two classical cases of  and . 
In the first two cases, the cyclic groups used have orders larger than the 
square of that used in . Thus, the message space is enlarged with no 
additional efforts required for finding the prime p. Moreover, the 
computational procedures in these groups are not much different from 
those used in the classical case. Hence, we propose to work in the setting 
of Z
*
pZ *2mF
*
pZ
p[x]/<x2> whenever the prime p generated is of the form 4k+1. If the 
prime p generated is of the form 4k+3, then we propose to work either in 
Zp[x]/<x2> or Z[i]/<β>.  
   The third case generalizes the classical ElGamal scheme in the 
multiplicative group of a finite field of characteristic two. Let GmF2 1 be 
the multiplicative group and let G*
2m
F 2 be the multiplicative group of the 
quotient ring Z2[x]/<h(x)>, where h(x) = h1(x).h2(x)...hr(x) is a product of 
irreducible polynomials with deg hj(x) = dj and the dj′s are pairwise 
relatively prime. In the following, we list some remarks comparing the 
two methods.  
• Cryptographic applications in rings of characteristic two, such as 
Z2[x]/<h(x)>, are of particular interest. The arithmetic in these 
rings can be efficiently performed both in software and in 
hardware. 
• The field Fq is constructed by generating an irreducible polynomial 
f(x) of degree m in Z2[x] and forming Z2[x]/<f(x)>= . Therefore, 
the operations in G
mF2
1 and G2 are the same.  
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• The order of G1 is 2m−1 and the order of G2 is ( )( ) ( )12...1212 21 −−− rddd . 
• In both cases irreducible polynomials must be found, one in the 
classical case and two or more in the new settings. This may 
suggest that the classical case is more efficient. However, finding 
irreducible polynomials of small degree can be obtained much 
more quickly than finding one irreducible polynomial of large 
degree.  
• Efficient implementation of the arithmetic in Z2[x]/<h(x)> can 
usually be achieved if the irreducible polynomial chosen has few 
non-zero terms. In particular, efficient algorithms for finding 
Irreducible trinomials exist, see [7].  
• Given an irreducible polynomial hj(x) of degree dj over Zp, there 
are more efficient methods for generating new irreducible 
polynomials of the same degree from hj(x). Hence, once G2 has 
been generated, it is easier to generate another with the same 
order. In particular, if xd + xk + 1 is irreducible over Z2 then so is xd 
+ xd−k + 1. 
• A generator in Fq can be found by randomly selecting an element 
and checking its order. The algorithm is based on the factorization 
of the order of the multiplicative group q−1=2m−1, which is a very 
large number and maybe hard to factor. Theorem 1 may be 
applied to find a generator α(x) for the multiplicative group of 
Z2[x]/<h(x)> as follows. Find a generator to each of the 
multiplicative groups of Z2[x]/<hj(x)>, 1 ≤ j ≤ r, and combine these 
generators using the Chinese Remainder Theorem to obtain α(x).  
This method should be faster because it depend on the 
factorization of the smaller orders  .,...,, rddd 121212 21 −−−
• A polynomial h(x) is a primitive polynomial if x is a generator of 
U(Z2[x]/<hj(x)>). Let f(x) ∈ Zp[x] be an irreducible polynomial of 
degree d. There is an efficient algorithm for testing whether or not 
f(x) is a primitive polynomial whenever the factorization of the 
integer 2d−1 is known. In particular, if 2d−1 is a prime, then every 
polynomial in U(Z2[x]/<h(x)>) is generator including x  so that x is 
primitive. Hence, if dj is selected so that 12 −jd  is prime, then x is 
a generator for the factor U(Z2[x]/<hj(x)>). A table listing either a 
primitive trinomial or a primitive pentanomial of degree d over Z2 
is given in [7], where d is an exponent of one of the first 27 
Mersenne primes (primes of the form 2d−1).  
• By theorem 1, >< )x(h
]x[2Z  and ><⊕⊕>< )x(h
]x[...
)x(h
]x[
r
2
1
2 ZZ  are 
isomorphic so that Entity A may choose to work in  
ComSIS Vol.2, No.1,  June 2005                                                                          75 
A. N. El-Kassar, Ramzi A. Haraty 
><⊕⊕>< )x(h
]x[...
)x(h
]x[
r
2
1
2 ZZ  and use the isomorphism to convert the 
computation to and from >< )x(h
]x[2Z . Entity B would not know 
whether or not >< )x(h
]x[2Z  is a field and must work in this setting.  
• The new proposed scheme has the property that breaking it 
requires both factoring the modulus h(x) and solving the discrete 
logarithm problem. If a cryptanalyst somehow learns the factors of 
h(x), then in order to recover plaintext from ciphertext it is still 
left with the task of solving the discrete logarithm problem modulo 
the factors of h(x). 
 
8. Conclusion 
Using a characterization of quotient rings of polynomials over finite fields 
with a cyclic group of units, the ElGamal encryption scheme was extended 
in two different ways in the setting of Fq[x]/<f(x)> where f(x) is a reducible 
polynomial in Fq[x]. Algorithms for the extended cryptosystem in the 
setting of Zp[x]/<x²> were given along with their proofs. Numerical 
example was provided to illustrate the new method. Also, the case of 
extending ElGamal cryptosystem to the settings of the multiplicative 
group of the ring Z2[x]/<h(x)>, where h(x) = h1(x).h2(x)...hr(x) is a product 
of irreducible polynomials with deg hj = dj and the dj′s are pairwise 
relatively prime, was considered. In this case one need to find irreducible 
polynomials over Z2 and no large prime is generated. A list some of 
advantages of the new method over the classical case in working in a 
finite field of characteristic two along with and remarks on the efficiency 
were given.  These remarks and comparative studies of the methods will 
be investigated in future work.  
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